Problem: The US is unable to decisively win wars because the Department of Defense is routinely tasked to nation build, to conduct stabilization actives, or counterinsurgency that require providing governance, essential services, aid, and support in addition to security to a population. There is no entity within the USG organized, trained, and equipped to conduct these critical activities even though they are required every single time the US fights and every single time the US does not fight.
Solution: Reform USAID organizationally, administratively, and culturally to place that agency in charge of all global development efforts in pursuit of national security. Remove DOD, who normally takes on development responsibilities, from the development business except as in support to USAID. Allow DOD to exclusively focus on war fighting and deterring adversaries through strength. A USAID organized, trained, equipped and most importantly authorized/empowered to accomplish all development initiatives will have a role after conflict and during counterinsurgency, but also during routine engagement with nations to make more effective use of US resources sent abroad in pursuit of US national security interests.
I have six specific recommendations:
- Update the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to mandate all development activities through USAID.
- Make USAID a cabinet level department providing them control over their own budget, adding the USAID director to the NSC, and align all interagency development efforts for maximum national security impact
- Enhance USAID education and training by creating “Professional Development Education” akin to DOD Professional Military Education for mid-career officers to gain the requisite expertise to ensure development is used effectively.
- Decentralize development execution to the US Embassy level. Appoint a USAID lead, co-equal rank with the Deputy Chief of Mission with authority over all development, across all departments and agencies with that nation. This would enable maximum flexibility to negotiate with that nation to achieve the absolute best deal for US assistance.
- Establish USAID - DOD personnel sharing programs. The USAID culture must be aimed at national security through development in the same way that DOD culture must be aimed at national security through defense/security.
- Create Department of State foreign governance training with the primary responsibility to teach effective governance to foreign partners. Development, defense, and diplomacy are the three pillars of international engagement yet only the first two maintain the ability to export their disciplines.
The result of these recommendations will be:
- All development support provided to partners will be aligned across the interagency and. comprehensive development strategy may be established, as opposed to the status quo where every department retains their own development agendas.
- US personnel abroad will be emboldened with the authority and resources to negotiate with their host nation partner by leveraging all instruments of power. This will enable them to influence the interests of that host nation to align with those of the US setting the stage for successful building partnership initiatives.
- Tailorable development initiatives directed at a partner nation will be uniquely suited to that country rather than a “one-size-fits-all” approach directed from DC.
- Enable the US to more rapidly respond to a host nation’s needs and close space that can be exploited by an adversary to gain influence with a nation.
- Place good governance and economic enlargement at the center of nation building and development abroad and move security, and the DOD, to a supporting role.
- Allow the DOD to focus on deterring war and maintaining the ability to defeat any adversary on earth without spending resources on preparing for nation building and development.
The enduring strategic imperative of the United States in the 21st century during times of war, post-war, crisis, or routine engagement during times of peace, is to development and to achieve a better state of peace alongside partners and allies, but also with non-aligned nations to seek advantage and prevent US adversaries from making in-roads. Historically, the DOD is relied upon to conduct these activities, not because of deliberate choice, but because they are the only organization organized, trained, and equipped to conduct them.
“… war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.”
-T.E. Lawrence
These words were first written by T.E. Lawrence in 1922 to capture his experiences while serving as British liaison officer with rebel forces during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks from 1916 to 1918. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl would embrace Lawrence’s words eighty years later in his book, “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” as he sought fundamental reform of modern U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The paradox of eating soup with a knife perfectly illustrates the problem this suggestion addresses. The enduring grand strategy of the U.S. has been to develop nations and even to attempt to convert them into representative democracies in the form of post-war reconstruction, counterinsurgency, or routine stability operations. Despite an understanding that a whole-of-government approach is required, the military has repeatedly emerged as the department responsible for nation building activities. It was essential for tactical and operational experts like Lawrence and Lieutenant Colonel Nagl to learn to eat soup with a knife, for a knife is all they had. It is past time, however, for national level, strategic leaders to finally provide a spoon.