Independent Oversight and Anti-Corruption Agency

Liberty
1

Independent Oversight and Anti-Corruption Agency (IOACA)

  1. Establishment and Authority

Foundational Mandate:

The IOACA would be established by federal law with a clear mandate to investigate, monitor, and enforce laws and regulations regarding ethics, corruption, financial disclosure, and lobbying restrictions for all federal officials, including the President, Congress members, the Supreme Court, and high-ranking agency officials.

Powers Granted:

The agency would have authority to:

Investigate and prosecute ethics violations, financial conflicts of interest, and lobbying breaches.

Enforce transparency through mandatory financial disclosures and audit powers.

Issue subpoenas, access relevant documents, and call witnesses in investigations.

Independence:

To prevent political influence, IOACA leadership would be appointed for a single, non-renewable 10-year term. Leaders would be selected through a bipartisan congressional committee and confirmed by the Senate, with dismissal only possible for proven misconduct or gross negligence.

  1. Leadership and Internal Structure

Independent Director and Board:

The agency would be led by an Independent Director, supported by a five-member bipartisan board, with each member serving staggered terms to avoid synchronized turnovers.

Board members and the Director would have extensive ethics, legal, or regulatory backgrounds to ensure qualified, objective oversight.

Specialized Divisions:

Investigation Division: Manages complaints, investigations, and audits.

Prosecution Division: Brings cases to court when officials violate ethics laws.

Public Disclosure Division: Oversees compliance with financial disclosures, lobbying, and post-service restrictions, and makes reports available to the public.

  1. Transparency and Public Reporting

Annual Public Reports:
The IOACA would publish a detailed annual report, available to the public, summarizing all investigations, enforcement actions, and notable findings.

Case Database:

All closed cases, outcomes, and penalties would be documented in a publicly accessible database, protecting individual confidentiality when necessary but prioritizing transparency on violations.

Public Complaints and Whistleblower Portal:

The agency would offer an online platform for citizens and federal employees to report unethical behavior, submit complaints, and track the status of significant cases.

  1. Enforcement and Penalties

Wide-Ranging Penalties:

The agency would have the authority to impose fines, disqualify individuals from federal office, refer criminal cases to the Department of Justice, and recommend penalties such as suspension, disqualification, or removal from office.

Anti-Retaliation Protections for Whistleblowers:

Robust protections would shield whistleblowers from retaliation, with legal safeguards and financial incentives to encourage reporting. IOACA could also award a portion of recovered fines to whistleblowers whose reports lead to enforcement actions.

Restitution and Recovery:

Officials found guilty of corruption or significant violations would be required to pay restitution, return illicit earnings, or face personal asset forfeiture when penalties are insufficient.

  1. Preventing Political Influence and Ensuring Accountability

Independent Budget and Funding:

The IOACA would be funded independently through a federal trust fund with automatic appropriations, ensuring that the agency’s operations are not subject to annual budget approvals or political influence.

Conflict-Free Staffing:

Staff members and investigators would be hired based on merit and ethics experience, with strict conflict-of-interest policies. Any staff with personal or family ties to subjects under investigation would be reassigned or removed from the case.

Regular Congressional Oversight Hearings:

The agency would report to Congress twice a year, detailing its activities, challenges, and case outcomes. While Congress could question and audit IOACA’s operations, it would have no authority to interfere in specific cases or investigative decisions.

  1. Strong Safeguards to Maintain Independence

Fixed-Term Appointments with Limited Removal Protections:

The Director and board members would have fixed, staggered terms and could only be removed by a two-thirds Senate vote following an independent inquiry and finding of serious misconduct, insulating the agency from political retaliation.

Transparency in Investigations:

All investigation steps, once initiated, would be publicly logged and updated to prevent politically motivated halting or manipulation of cases.

Oversight by External Watchdogs:

An independent council of ethics experts from academia and nonpartisan watchdog groups would review IOACA’s performance annually, ensuring the agency operates effectively and suggesting improvements.

2

This is all thought out, but it is still asking the government to investigate its own wrongdoings. If the founders believed that a single government agency could be freed from corruption and be made the overseer of the federal government, then they would have created that and the whole system of selecting members and the rest. Instead, they viewed governing bodies as constantly greedy for power and designed a system of checks and balances to make these bodies compete for power.

Personally, I do not believe that such an agency could be made corruption free no matter what regulations are put in place. Bipartisan checks are fundamentally flawed, as evidenced by the continuing resolutions and debt deals in Congress. Hiring based on merit rather than partisanship is not possible as evidenced by the Civil Service. Impeachment of members will become a political issue no matter what.

It is Congress’s job to investigate and try government employees for misconduct. While there is already a House Oversight Committe, it is still flawed. Perhaps resolutions could be passed to enhance the committee and regulate its proceedings more. Some of these ideas like anti-retaliation for whistleblowers and case databases could be just as easily implemented in a congressional committee. Ultimately, the issue will be resolved much easier by draining the swamp in DC and taking the powers away from the government agencies, which are unconstitutional most of the time anyway. If the corruption can be minimized to a handful of employees, it makes it much easier to bring them before a committee and try and impeach them then it would an entire bureaucracy.

1 Like
3

Thanks so much for the feedback, it’s a valid point that asking the government to police itself is a real challenge. I was thinking that an independent agency dedicated solely to investigating other government agencies could help keep corruption down. I understand that Congress has an oversight committee, but they’re also handling many other responsibilities. Having an agency focused exclusively on rooting out corruption would add a needed layer of oversight.

I agree that the oversight committee brings issues to light, but it often feels like nothing really gets done after that. My hope is that an independent agency like this would not only uncover corruption but also have the authority to prosecute it, ensuring real accountability