It’s generally accepted that there are three criteria for “free and fair” elections:
- Only eligible voters are allowed to cast ballots
- Those ballots are counted as cast
- The secrecy of the ballot caster is maintained
What if we could convince you that we can achieve all of those things without sacrificing the important protections of ballot secrecy? Would that change your opinion?
Imagine this, what if each voter effectively submitted two ballots, the original, and a digital copy made from the original (a “ballot audit image”), verified by the voter as being accurate at the time of casting, with measures in place to ensure the images can not be modified once submitted (yes, this is doable), and the “audit images” have an entirely separate authority (custodian) responsible for its chain of custody. We could duplicate this “ballot image audit database” to as many custodians as you feel necessary to ensure that no one could get away with changing these ballot images without being detected.
These audit images are not part of the counting, they are a separate copy of all the ballots used for independent auditing purposes.
“The system” would count the original ballots, and these audit copies would be made available to the public by each of the independent custodians (most likely by download from a website) at the same time the results are announced.
Citizens can then compare the number of ballots counted, as reported by the official election results, to the number of recorded “audit images” (ballots submitted), as well as do their own count of the audit image database using image processing software which many competent people could create in the current era.
For mail-in ballots we might be able to devise an electronic system that allows the voter to use a smartphone to upload a photo of their ballot before mailing it in that also protects their ballot secrecy, but let’s assume we aren’t ready to go that far as I think we can do a reasonably trustworthy process without that.
Assuming mail-in ballots are going to require some level of trust, I propose that as the ballots are removed from their secrecy envelopes they have their “audit image” taken at that time. Individuals in the receiving office are responsible for verifying that the audit image taken matches the selections on the secret ballot they are holding. These individuals do not count the ballots, they are “signing off” under penalty of perjury or something similar, that the “audit image” matches the ballot they are processing.
There are various versions of who these audit imagers could be to ensure trust, but I think, given the number of individuals required to process the mail-in ballots, if there were any shenanigans at this step, given how specific and limited it is, it would be difficult to modify the audit images in a way that “the cheaters”, whoever they might be, wouldn’t be discovered.
This mail-in image audit database is likewise copied to independent custodians and published alongside the election results.
There are other possible configurations we can come up with that can protect the integrity of our elections without sacrificing the highly valuable ballot secrecy.
It is not, as you imply, impossible or impractical.